December 18, 2014

Greedo Shot First: Logical and Logistical Difficulties in Separating Offensive and Defensive Peacekeepers

By Christian Chessman

The Star Wars universe was an indispensable element of my childhood. Faux battles with light sabers (sticks) in deep space (the neighbor’s yard) or hostile space (the cranky neighbor’s yard) were how I spent an immense amount of my free time in grade school. As I got older, I began to appreciate nuance in the Star Wars series. I understood that “Jedi” was considered a religion in the Star Wars universe; I read about the relationship between “midichlorians”¹ and Jedi superpowers; I considered whether some Jedi powers were inherently evil (good Jedi lightning sounded pretty cool even if it did kill Mace Windu).

But perhaps one of the most interesting nuances to discuss was “who shot first? Greedo or Han”². For those who are not Star Wars fans, the scene involves a bounty hunter named Greedo who sought to collect a bounty on one of the main characters, Han Solo. Greedo sits down across from Han at a table in the cantina where Greedo found Han. They talk briefly, and then suddenly there is an explosion from a laser blaster that obscures the screen. When the dust settles, Greedo is dead and Han escapes to fight another day.

The debate between Star Wars nerds raged: who shot first? Did Han assault a lawful bounty hunter who simply sought to bring a fugitive to justice? Did Greedo violently escalate a situation in an effort to avoid the difficulties of bringing in a live prisoner, and then suffer the consequences of Han’s self-defense? The debate over who shot first meaningfully changes the entire nature of the exchange.

For a long time, the “Han shot first” camp was vocal and persuasive – they persuaded the majority of people interested in the discussion that they were correct. Their view remained the dominant view until George Lucas, the creator of Star Wars, definitively settled the debate: Greedo shot first. The revelation sent shockwaves through the Star Wars community, and an overwhelming number of people simply chose to ignore Lucas’ proclamation and defend that Han still shot first.

The scene ironically demonstrates a key problem in delineating peacekeeping operations as offensive or defensive. In this article, I will argue there are four reasons UN Peacekeepers (PKOs) have always been de facto offensive regardless of their de jure escalation abilities³.

Fights are messy.

Defensive PKOs are legally understood as operations that only use force in response to provocation, and for the purpose of defending the peacekeepers. Intuitively, this definition seems satisfying – it provides clear guidelines for when and how peacekeepers may use force. Unfortunately, the “defensive” distinction breaks down in the practical messiness of warfare.

First, the extent of danger a soldier must experience is unclear. A UN peacekeeper is defensively justified in shooting back at an enemy even if the enemy misses. A peacekeeper is arguably also justified in shooting at an enemy if the enemy is shooting at their nearby allies. But how close must the allied peacekeepers be to the fight to be justified in shooting? What if a fight is occurring very close by, but is between two other groups and is not apparently targeted at the UN soldiers? The UN peacekeepers are certainly in danger of being hit by stray bullets – is that enough to trigger “defense”? What if a UN peacekeeper is actually hit by an accidental stray bullet – is that sufficient?⁴ What if the peacekeepers deliberately put themselves in the line of fire – should that matter?⁵

Second, the scope of combatants is hard to define. In the example above, the enemy combatant shooting at the UN peacekeeper is clearly within the group of people who the peacekeeper is justified in “defensively” shooting. Are the people providing ammunition reloads to the shooters also fair game? What about the people providing the shooters with intelligence during the fight about UN peacekeeper troop movements – can they be shot?⁶

Third, it’s hard to tell who is a combatant. The majority of situations in which UN peacekeepers are deployed involve asymmetric warfare⁷. These fights are substantially messier than historical battles between states: enemy fighters⁸ do not wear uniforms; enemy fighters do not restrict themselves to “military zones”, and may use civilian infrastructure as bases for operations; enemy fighters deliberately do not directly confront the state’s larger force; enemy fighters primarily rely on guerilla warfare tactics, like ambush and subterfuge. Even if it was easy to determine what type of role (e.g. shooter, ammo-refiller, intel-provider) should be shot, it is not easy to determine what role a particular person is fulfilling at any given moment. Role determinations are complicated by shifts in the roles played by any given enemy – an enemy who is an ammo-refiller in one moment may be a shooter in the next moment, and vice versa.

These three ambiguities are inherent in every modern combat situation, and make the distinction between offensive and defensive combat incoherent. Instead, they show that very little about the actual practice of war will change with the nominal grant of additional power. If even slight extents of danger are sufficient to trigger defense, then functionally all combat is “defensive” in some sense. What new combat would arise under “offensive” operations? If there is no logical limit on the scope of combatants, then peacekeepers are justified in “defending” themselves against any enemy can be attacked. What new enemies are then encompassed by “offensive” label? If enemies shift between roles that make it functionally impossible to delineate between offensive combatants and non-combatants, then peacekeepers have no way to determine who to shoot. How does this change with permission to use offensive tactics?

Little – if anything – will be changed in the actual practice of peacekeeping by the nominal grant of offensive power.

Problem of Proof

A further problem arises as a result of the absence of independent accountability for combat conduct. Even if there were no problems involved in distinguishing “defensive” from “offensive” operations, there are functionally no institutional checks preventing peacekeepers from conducting offensive missions and calling them defensive.

For example, suppose a group of peacekeepers had fought with group X a day prior and sustained heavy casualties. The peacekeepers knew X was not going to attack them anymore because they had turned their resources and interests to other matters. The peacekeepers, angry at their casualties and seeking revenge, strike group X without provocation but then call the operation defensive, claiming that group X shot first⁹^,¹⁰,¹¹.

How would that claim be disproven? There are not independent observers who witness all combat. Essentially, the claim would come down to the word of a UN peacekeeping unit versus the word of insurgent group X (if the group even chose to dispute it publicly). If the credibility dispute is predictably resolved in favor of the UN peacekeepers, they got away with conduct that would otherwise be classified offensive. In short, peacekeeping forces have functionally had the discretion to use offensive force at their choosing because it is difficult to prove conduct that was called “defensive” was actually “offensive” in nature.

Strategic Implications

The strategic implication of the argument is that the UN has always had the de facto ability to conduct offensive peacekeeping operations when it wanted to do so. The ambiguities of combat and problems of proof in delineating between offensive and defensive operations give the UN and its peacekeepers broad latitude in determining exactly how they wish to conduct themselves in war.

The de facto ability to conduct offensive operations can be exploited by the negative. Many affirmatives will decry specific historical examples, and suggest that historical UN failures have been the result of the rule that prevents the UN from using offensive force. The above analysis demonstrates turns every one of those examples, because it proves the UN had the ability to use offensive force all along. Instead, the analysis shows the failure to use offensive force is not a practical problem – since the UN could have used the needed force and called it “defensive” based on any of the above explanations – the problem is political willpower. Countries have little interest in letting their soldiers be killed for issues unrelated to their national interests. As a result, most countries have a tendency to withdraw their troops as soon as their people start getting killed in any meaningful amount. Resource commitment issues have plagued UN operations since their inception, and result in half-baked solutions that fail to bring peace and end conflict.

This puts the affirmative in a double bind: either countries have not had the political will to use offensive force because they want to avoid casualties (which means permission to use offensive force does not solve anything) or countries have had the political will to use offensive force (and it has failed miserably, as demonstrated by affirmative examples of UN failure). In either case, the negative has justified a ballot.

Conclusion

The practical ambiguities of modern warfare give the United Nations broad discretion in deciding how to conduct its operations. The label “defensive operations” is itself misleading because the scope of conduct which can properly be considered “defensive” is so extensive as to make “defensive” operations indistinguishable from “offensive” operations. As a result, historical examples of UN failure cannot be attributed to a lack of offensive capability and instead demonstrate that offensive capability is not the solution to modern conflict situations.

Citations and Notes

[1] Though unimportant to this article, an explanation of midichlorians is available here: http://www.starwars.com/news/so-what-the-heck-are-midi-chlorians

[2] The scene – and a brief discussion of its history - is available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mu-TZpGdszA#t=40

[3] “de facto” means “concerning fact”, and deals with functional and practical realities. It is contrasted with “de jure”, which means “concerning law” and deals with explicit rules and prohibitions. An illustrative example: presume President Obama promised not to enforce marihuana laws without actually repealing them. There is a de jure prohibition on marihuana (since it remains illegal) but a de facto ability to use and grow marihuana (since the absence of enforcement means the rule does not ultimately constrain people from growing marihuana). The de jure/de facto dichotomy typically deals with situations where there is an unenforced or practically unenforceable rule that technically remains on the books but does not actually change the conduct of the people involved.

[4] Debaters might be tempted to respond that the peacekeepers are only justified in defending themselves against attacks intentionally aimed at the peacekeepers. Though abstractly workable, this presents practical field problems: how are peacekeepers supposed to divine their attackers’ intent in the middle of a firefight? What if the attacker is simply reckless rather than intentional (i.e. the attacker does not avoid shooting peacekeepers but does not deliberately try to shoot them either)? What if the attacker changes their mind mid-fight and decides to shoot the peacekeepers? Each of these examples demonstrates that intent is not a workable standard for evaluating the scope of combat.

[5] Traditional self-defense law requires the self-defender to attempt to retreat before using force, based on the argument that self-defense is not necessary if the confrontation can be avoided altogether. Any operation that is “defensive” in nature does not seek out provocation – which also seems to require actively avoiding situations where provocation will arise. How far UN peacekeepers should be required to go in avoiding conflict is ambiguous and difficult to conceptually define – let alone to define on an ad hoc basis in the field as situations arise.

[6] Both the intelligence person and the ammunition person are clearly essential elements to the success of the initial shooter, and thus put the UN peacekeepers in increased risk of danger. It appears that if the UN is justified in shooting the original shooter as well as the supporters who are essential elements in the success of the shooter. But under the essential element principle, UN peacekeepers would be justified in shooting the people who feed and house enemy combatants before and after the fight as well. The enemies could not be successful without food and shelter, thus the UN would be justified in killing them as well. It is difficult to imagine any enemy who does not have some supportive connection to the fight, which makes the scope of combatants who may be attacked under the banner of “defense” unlimited.

[7] Asymmetric warfare refers to a disparity between the relative power of the combatants in such a way that the disparity changes battlefield tactics. For example, in World War I, Germany openly met Britain and France on the frontlines of Alsace-Lorraine. Germany did not hide; and their strategy was to directly confront the Allies and overwhelm them with superior fighting force. There were clear, physically demarcated sides: Germany to the East, and the Allies to the West. Modern war bears little resemblance to this type of fighting. The overwhelming majority of modern warfare does not occur between two states; it occurs between a state and one or several subnational actors. For example, the war against Iraq’s government was over in April of 2003, less than a month after the invasion began. Yet the fight in Iraq continued until December 2011, over eight years after the government fell. The reason fighting continued is that the United States (and company) was no longer fighting a state government; it was fighting subnational actors like the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

[8] For purposes of this explanation, the “enemy” fighters are subnational actors fighting a state actor.

[9] This situation is not far from the reality of UN peacekeeping operations. Peacekeepers have a documented record of committing crimes against humanity (including sex trafficking) in the places they were deployed to protect. Corruption and abuse are exacerbated by lack of jurisdiction to prosecute soldiers – the UN itself cannot prosecute – which leaves soldiers with essentially no accountability for misconduct. It is not surprising that corruption and abuse flourish in these circumstances. http://www.academia.edu/1528562/Protectors_on_trial_Prosecuting_peacekeepers_for_war_crimes_and_crimes_against_humanity_in_the_International_Criminal_Court

[10] Interestingly enough, UN peacekeepers smuggled arms and ammunition for profit to the allies of the DRC group they were eventually sent to fight in 2013 offensive operation in the DRC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/panorama/7331077.stm

[11] In this situation, the UN peacekeepers need not even assert that group X actually attacked them – only that they were preempting an attack. The distinction between preemption and prevention further complicates purely defensive operations. Pre-emption occurs when peacekeepers understand that an attack is imminent, and strike first to reduce their own casualties. Preventative strikes occurs when peacekeepers believe a group is likely to attack at some point, but do not have evidence that such an attack is imminent. Preemption is legally classified as defensive, because the attack is imminent. Prevention is legally classified as offensive, because the attack is not imminent. Thus, a claim that force was used to preempt enemy attacks is still cognizable as “defensive”. Once peacekeepers claim their conduct was preemptive and defensive, the burden of proof shifts to opponents (typically the enemy combatants themselves) to prove otherwise – a nearly impossible task.