January 13, 2015

My Kingdom for a Card

By Christian Chessman

The January Public Forum topic is my favorite topic this year for a variety of reasons. I favor it personally and as a coach because it returns to the international relations literature in which I got my degree. But I also favor the topic as a judge, because it forces debaters to correct a problem I have discussed previously: overreliance on statistical studies¹. Every debater with whom I have discussed this topic has lamented the absence of statistical studies² on offensive peacekeeping operations conducted by the United Nations. These debaters take this fact to suggest that there are no studies on the subject matter of the January topic. They are wrong.

In this article, I suggest that the apparently conventional wisdom lamenting an absence of statistical evidence is misguided. Instead, I argue that nearly every major statistical study of offensive foreign interventions is applicable to the topic. The intuitive sentiment that every detail in a study must be identical to the topic area is neither accurate nor consistent with normal Public Forum Debate practice³. Debaters can make use of pre-existing statistical evidence by arguing that there are no relevant differences between the interventions examined in their studies and the interventions which are the object of study for the topic.

Object of Study

One reason that debaters might initially balk at this topic is that they misapprehend the object of the resolution. The essential core of the January 2015 Public Forum topic is not the United Nations – it is offensive foreign interventions. Foreign interventions conducted under the auspices of UN direction may have some dissimilarities to other coalitional interventions⁴, but debaters should not assume those dissimilarities are game changers – or indeed that they are relevant at all.

There are two reasons why debaters can apply other studies on offensive foreign interventions to this topic: first, they are relevant because asymmetric warfare makes most differences in operation conduct immaterial. Second, these studies are relevant because operational commonalities between various coalitional interventions are so substantial that they overwhelm mere collateral differences.

Asymmetric Warfare⁵

The two most cited differences between offensive UN PKOs and other interventions concern legitimacy and technology. I will deal with each in turn.

The argument from legitimacy suggests that UN PKOs are more legitimate because of their international nature, and that their higher degree of legitimacy assists in fostering peace and institution building. Indeed, the major concern in developing new state institutions is guaranteeing that those institutions are perceived as legitimate rather than transient or biased. Arguably, a more legitimate intervention should produce more legitimate institutions, because civilians perceive the institutions as being credibly founded instead of corruptly founded.

There are two major problems with using legitimacy to distinguish UN PKOs from other interventions. First, legitimacy is an issue of perception – it is not objectively measurable, but rather exists in the eye of the beholder⁶. Arguments from legitimacy assume that the enemy combatants and civilians actually perceive the level of legitimacy of the intervening force. This is unlikely the case – several factors contribute to a perception gap for people in high conflict situations. In part, citizens in conflict scenarios are not likely to be inundated with Western media – or any media for that matter – and are therefore less likely to be exposed to indicators of legitimacy. For all these citizens know, the UN soldiers are impersonators attempting to lull them into complacency and kill them⁷. This information gap is especially exacerbated by the decentralized and guerilla nature of asymmetric warfare – there is no central organization to persuade that the mission is indeed legitimate. Citizens and combatants may also simply ignore information suggesting legitimacy on an ideological basis. An ideology that treats Western interventions as presumptively imperialist precludes seeing missions as legitimate by definition. Under such an ideology, interventions are never legitimate, regardless of how much consensus backs the mission.

The second issue with using legitimacy to distinguish UN interventions from other interventions is that such arguments presume static levels of legitimacy. Not all missions are created equal – some UN missions may appear more legitimate while others fail to gain the same recognition⁸. Mission legitimacy also varies outside the UN as well – for example, the NATO missions into Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States were widely lauded as legitimate. The NATO intervention into Afghanistan was arguably more legitimate than many UN operations. Thus, it cannot be said that UN missions are categorically more legitimate than non-UN missions⁹. Further, it is unclear that legitimacy is an indicator of success: the United States invasion of Afghanistan appeared legitimate by every major indicator of legitimacy, and failed miserably¹⁰. It appears that legitimacy does not automatically confer success on a mission or change its operational result.

In short, legitimacy does not appear to be a valid basis for distinguishing operation types. Mission legitimacy changes over time, relies on perception by populations structurally unlikely to perceive it, and does not consistently correlate with mission success or failure.

The second major difference cited to distinguish UN PKOs from other interventions deals with technology. The argument from technology relies on the notion that mixing international forces will result in technology sharing that enhances mission capabilities and success rate.

There are three problems with this argument. First, the argument assumes countries are willing to share their offensive technologies. States are notoriously protective of offensive weapons technologies, so the mere potential to share technology does not automatically transfer into a guarantee of sharing.

Second, technology sharing is not unique to UN PKOs – major regional security initiatives like NATO have the same opportunity for technology sharing. It is worth noting that technology arguments also makes every major intervention by the United States relevant. The United States has the most advanced military technology in the world¹¹. In that sense, United States interventions represent the optimal aspiration of every UN PKO mission¹², because every soldier is armed with the best technology, weapons, and training¹³.

Third, power preponderance is not the name of the game in asymmetrical warfare: the name of the game is hide and seek. For example, Al Qaeda’s strategy has never been to line its soldiers up and face the US military head on. Instead, Al Qaeda combines attrition with incision for a guerrilla warfare strategy. Guerilla warfare strategies mean that better technology is not a game changer – it does not matter if Denmark uses a giant tank or the United States uses a super-giant tank when the enemy's strategy is to hide from your tank regardless of size. Thus, the degree of force preponderance becomes irrelevant because the enemy’s strategy relies on selectively avoiding confrontation¹⁴.

Commonalities and Common Enemies

There is a universal commonality that ties all forms of offensive peacekeeping together: the use of force. The primary concern for both civilians and combatants in conflict situations is to avoid being killed. Thus, there are three fundamental concerns involved in offensive peacekeeping which have nothing to do with the banner under which the peacekeeper fights: the degree of force, the context of force, and the propriety of force.

The first commonality is the degree of force. Survival is main concern for groups involved in conflicts. It is not important who is shooting at them – what is important is that they are being shot at. These combatants are going to fight just as hard against UN PKOs as other intervenors if they feel their survival is threatened. Thus, offensive degrees of force are likely to produce similar try-or-die reactions in combatants.

The second commonality is the context of force. Force may be used to accomplish regime change, eliminate particular political factions, guarantee the distribution of goods and medicine, or reinforce social and political institutions. The empirical literature is clear that the nature and context of the mission – not the agent conducting the mission – is determinative of the likelihood of success. A targeted assassination is simple for both offensive UN peacekeepers and other intervenors when compared to installing a new political regime. In that sense, the banner under which force is exercised is trivial in comparison to the purpose for which force is exercised.

The third commonality is propriety of force. Intervenors are regularly faced with complicated political situations where it is unclear which group – if any – should be backed. In Syria, there are no political groups with clean hands – the Assad regime used chemical weapons against its civilians and the rebels have ties to Al Qaeda. Interventors may also face situations where it is clear some group has clean hands, but it is not clear which group in particular has clean hands. For example, an observer with no knowledge of the Russia/Ukraine conflict might see native Ukrainians starting fights with Russian occupiers and incorrectly conclude that Ukraine started the conflict. Given the UN’s consistent dearth of cultural knowledge, misunderstandings like this are not uncommon. The degree of knowledge regarding local culture, norms, and social dynamics shapes the times and places force is deployed, which in turn shape the effectiveness of the force.

In sum, citizens and combatants are more concerned about avoiding bullets than identifying shooters. The type of mission – perhaps the most important concern in predicting success – also does not vary based on wear the label being worn by the peacekeepers. Finally, the process of selecting groups to support is not altered by the identity of the peacekeepers involved in the situation.

In Round Deployment

There are two ways debaters should deploy this type of argument in around. First, debaters should identify the overwhelming commonalities between the foreign interventions discussed in their evidence and the foreign interventions conducted by the UN. Debaters should argue that these core commonalities are sufficient that comparison can be reasonably made. For example, debaters could argue that their studies examine coalitional intervention by the same countries using the same tactics as they would uamine rites argue that xplain eir opponents - a ties ence that those commonalities trump nder a UN banner. The major players in NATO are the same countries staffing the majority of UN missions. On this argument, debaters should do analysis specifically applying the warrants in their cards to future UN operations. Debaters may want to couple identifying similarities with contextually explaining why differences do not matter. For example, debaters may want to identify the irrelevance of coalitional legitimacy to asymmetrical warfare at this point in the debate.

Second, debaters should flip the burden on their opponents –make the other side prove your evidence is not relevant. The existence of evidence flips the presumption of correctness to your side – you have presented evidence of a truth claim and absent reason to reject it, that evidence should be accepted. When making these arguments, debaters do not have to treat relevance as an all-or-nothing concept. If debaters have a partially applicable study¹⁵ but their opponents have nothing, the initial debaters are ahead in the debate. Debaters should be sure to characterize precisely how their evidence applies to the particular contentions in the debate.

Conclusion

Though Champion debaters do not need cards to win rounds, support evidence may make the difference in a close round. Debaters should supplement their logical analysis of offensive PKOs with statistical evidence when it would benefit their case. To do so, debaters should scour the literature for studies which study analogous phenomena – other offensive foreign interventions. Debaters can use these studies by drawing key parallels between their studies and the UN’s peacekeeping operations. Debaters should simultaneously work to minimize differences by identifying them as irrelevant, and flipping the burden of proof to their opponents. In doing so, champion debaters will avail themselves of a broad literature base that bolsters their success.

Footnotes and Works Cited

[1] See my discussion of the “cult of cards” here: https://championbriefs.com/blog/cultofcards

[2] Debaters may be tempted to suggest there is a lack of “empirical evidence” on the topic. This is a misunderstanding about the distinction between empirical evidence and statistical evidence. Statistical evidence aggregates data points on a given subject, and then attempts to establish a relationship between those data points and a second phenomenon. In contrast, any evidence based on experience and observation is empirical evidence. For example, a paired case study or an ethnographic analysis of a country are both “empirical evidence” though they are not “statistical evidence”. Every piece of evidence discussing the 2013 offensive DRC operation is “empirical evidence”, and many are “empirical studies”. The normative and strategic implications of conflating “empirical” with “statistical” are beyond the scope of this post, but debaters should nonetheless bear the distinction between the two in mind during their rounds.

[3] For example, on the professional sports subsides topic, I cannot overemphasize the number of teams who treated a study of a single stadium in a single region under specific conditions (D.C. displacement study anyone?) as representative of broader trends in stadium construction.

[4] NATO, the African Standby Force, and a variety of ad hoc coalitions such as the current international coalition fighting ISIL are examples of coalitional interventions.

[5] For an explanation of asymmetrical warfare, see footnote seven of this article: https://championbriefs.com/blog/greedo_shot_first

[6] The first cross-x question on any legitimacy argument should be “legitimate in whose eyes?” Missions that appear legitimate to academics in the Western world may simply appear as another group of violent foreigners to citizens and combatants in conflict situations. This is especially true because UN PKOs traditionally fail at effectively grasping the nuances of local culture, norms, and practices. For a thorough treatment of the topic of culture and PKOs, see http://www.kaiptc.org/Publications/Occasional-Papers/Documents/no_4.aspx. For debaters who want to read this argument, see https://bookstore.usip.org/books/BookDetail.aspx?productID=180344

[7] In the past half-century, there are countless instances of impersonation of international organizations. In one particularly wrenching example, a survivor of the Rwandan genocide described how a Red Cross ambulance was driven into the center of her town. Her town was told to gather in the center square and then they would receive medical attention and care. When the citizens gathered in the square, armed militants jumped out of the Red Cross ambulance and then systematically raped and murdered the citizens. The slaughter was so methodical and regularized that the killers were convicted of “genocidal rape” by the ICT. See: http://www.history.vt.edu/Ewing/Sjoberg_GRISTPaper.pdf. Given the gritty history of mistrust of international institutions, the mere fact of wearing a particular uniform is not sufficient to trigger sentiments of legitimacy in the eyes of many citizenries.

[8] UN interventions are regularly tainted by accusations of corruption and fraud, which suggests that mission legitimacy may decrease even if it begins at a high level. A mission that starts with the appearance of legitimacy may find that image shattered as it becomes clear that UN troops are corrupt or even responsible for mass death. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/10/world/peacekeeping-by-un-faces-new-scrutiny-on-2-fronts.html?_r=0

[9] This is especially true because many of the factors that confer legitimacy – such as international consensus, just cause, proportional force use, and the absence of mala in se tactics – hold true for non-UN missions conducted by regional security coalitions like NATO.

[10] Apparent mission legitimacy is arguably actually a predictor of mission failure for many of the reasons the Afghanistan invasion failed: troops who perceive themselves on a moral crusade are more likely to be overconfident and make cultural mistakes. Further, ad hoc mixed international forces with different types and degrees of training are unlikely to mesh effectively together into an operational fighting unit. Consensus thus might be a disadvantage: it results in multinational troop combinations that fight less effectively.

[11] The US defense budget is greater than the sum of the collective budges of the 13 next highest spending countries combined – all of whom are allies to the US. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/07/everything-chuck-hagel-needs-to-know-about-the-defense-budget-in-charts/

[12] It is worth noting that UN technology sharing programs are likely to be incomplete – that is, less advanced countries are unlikely to have their soldiers’ gear wholly replaced by more advanced countries.

[13] US forces both better armed, and better suited to utilize those arms in battle because they have training with them. There is a higher learning curve for Nepalese soldiers, for example, who use a complicated drone program for the first time than for soldiers whose entire training involved that exact program.

[14] This is why Osama Bin Laden was able to avoid capture for such a long period of time – his strategy relied on superior knowledge of local terrains and his ability to hide. The United States simply could not bomb enough mountain networks to find him. This is the same problem that plagued the United States in the Vietnam War, where Viet Cong guerilla strategies dealt the United States major operational blows.

[15] A study may be partially applicable in several different sense of the term. One study may be partially applicable because it only studies one type of mission (e.g. foreign-imposed regime change). Another study may be partially applicable because the actors studied are not fully comparable to UN troops (e.g. a study in Rwandan peacekeepers).